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FILE No. NE Q 3/324/1 (Part B) 61 (61—85)

TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ
AND IRAN.

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P.M.H. S.E.	(61)(62)	29/6	P.H.	71	7/8	P.H.	(80)	10/10
Mr Wilson		29/6	Regy		6/8			13/4
D.J.M. P.H.	(61)(62)	1/7	P.H.	(72)	7/8			22/12
Regy		2/7	SLE	72		P.H.	(83)	2/11
P.M.H.	(61)(62)	8/7	Regy		1/8			1/2
Regy		3/7	P.H.		11/11	V.B.	(A)(B)	84 and 85
P.M.H.	(64)	3/7			24/8	Analysis Dept.		21/2
Regy		8	D.J.M.	(74)	24/8	Registers		1/2
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MAKES (not) Mr	(65)	17/7	P.H.	(74)	25/8	G.V.D.	84B	3/2
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Regy		30/7	Regy		9/10			
P.H.	(70)	20/7	P.H.	(79)	9/10			
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Mr MAKES m.H.	(70)	3/8	Mr Rundle.	(80)	5/11			

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
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FILE No.

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61

1/14



TEHRAN.

23 June, 1970

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Iranair Hijacking

Further to my letter (1/14) of today's date, it has now been revealed that the names given in yesterday's reports were assumed; the security authorities have established the real identity of the three hijackers, but are disclosing no details. According to one story, one of the hijackers was a student expelled from the Arya Mehr Technical University, which as you may remember from our previous correspondence about the bus strike, was a centre of student unrest in February. The ages of the three hijackers were given as 24, 23 and 14. In an interview, the Head of Iranair, General Khademi, has thanked the Iraqi authorities for arranging the speedy ~~authorities~~ ^{return} of the hijacked aircraft.

Yours,

C.D.S.

(C.D.S. Drace-Francis)

D.J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c. Chancery, Baghdad.

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(62)

1/14 Mr Makinson a.r.

BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEHRAN.

23 June, 1970

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

20 JUN 1970

NEQ 3/324/1

Dear James

Iranair Hijacking

This is to let you know, if you had not already seen from press reports, that an Iranair Boeing 727 with 91 passengers aboard, including Prince Shahryar, the son of Princess Ashraf, when on a regular flight from Tehran to Abadan and Kuwait on the evening of Sunday, 21 June, was hijacked by three Iranian students to Baghdad. The hijack took place about 12 minutes after take-off, apparently when the plane was near Qum. Two of the students suddenly sprang from their seats, brandishing small calibre automatic pistols, entered the flight deck and forced the pilot to take them to Baghdad, while the third member of the group threw a bottle of inflammable liquid on the floor of the aircraft and threatened to set it alight if the plane was not diverted. About half an hour later the plane landed at Baghdad, where, according to Iranian accounts, the hijackers asked the Iraqi authorities for asylum with the threat that they would direct the plane to Damascus if it were not granted. Apparently Iraqi officials agreed to their request after lengthy consultation and nearly 4 hours later the plane was allowed to fly back to Tehran. According to the pilot, the Iraqi authorities treated the passengers well during their forced stay in Baghdad.

2. For once, this incident was not hushed up by the Iranian authorities. On the contrary, it was given full publicity and has been followed by a spate of editorials and an announcement that the security measures at Mehrabad Airport will be tightened up. There is intense speculation about the hijackers themselves. The authorities have revealed that they were called Ali Mollahzadeh, his brother, Hassan, and Massoud Hamidi, all of them students of the School of Engineering at Tehran University. According to the passengers, they were long-haired hippy types and the younger Mollahzadeh, who threw the inflammable liquid on the floor of the cabin, looked no more than 14. The news of their successful hijack

/was balanced

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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was balanced by a report in the same day's press that five more disillusioned Iranian students, who were members of the "revolutionary organisation of the Tudeh Party abroad", including the nephew of the outlawed Tudeh Party Chief, Reza Radmanesh, had handed themselves over to the Iranian authorities after being convinced that the white revolution is better for Iran than Communism. As you may know, two other ex-Tudeh students, Dr. Parviz Parsanejad and Mr. Parviz Nik Khah, have made public confessions recently about their misguided political idealism. (We have sent full details to Ann Elwell in I.R.D.) But the authorities are clearly not going to reveal any more details about the hijackers to the public - at least until they recant!

*Yours ever
Jan Champin*

(060) (C. D. S. Drace-Francis)

C.C.

Chancery, BAGHDAD.

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J. M.

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B4 IRANIAN HIJACKERS ON BAGHDAD TV.

(BAGHDAD RADIO) THE THREE IRANIANS WHO FORCED AN IRANIAN AIRLINER TO LAND AT BAGHDAD AIRPORT (ED: ON 21ST JUNE) APPEARED ON BAGHDAD TELEVISION LAST NIGHT. ONE OF THEM SAID THAT THEY CARRIED OUT THE OPERATION TO DENOUNCE THE MISERABLE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE IRANIAN

PEOPLE AND TO PROTEST AGAINST THE SHAH'S POLICY AND HIS COOPERATION WITH WORLD ZIONISM. THEY THANKED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT FOR ITS CORDIALITY AND FOR GRANTING THEM POLITICAL ASYLUM.

END BBC MON 0846 29/6 LF (KY)

IRAN
PRESSE

Sat. 27 June

Les auteurs du déroutement de l'avion d'Iranair

Keyhan du 25 juin

On connaît l'identité des trois jeunes gens qui ont détourné un avion de ligne de l'Iranair qui se rendait à Abadan, vers Bagdad: ce sont Ali et Hassan Mollazadeh et Massoud Hadj Hamidi, tous trois originaires de Rézaïeh, en Azerbaïdjan occidental, et ces trois jeunes gens ont demandé l'asile politique en Irak.

Ali Mollazadeh (23 ans) semble avoir été l'inspirateur de ce détournement pour lequel il s'est entouré de son jeune frère Hassan Mollazadeh (12 ans) et de Massoud Hadj Hamidi.

Ali Mollazadeh, après avoir terminé ses études secondaires dans sa ville natale de Rézaïeh et venu à Téhéran l'année dernière et il se présente au concours de l'Académie Militaire. Il réussit ce concours, mais après quelques mois, il quitte l'Académie militaire et se présente au concours d'admission de l'Université technique Aryamehr. Au mois d'avril de cette année, il en est expulsé pour avoir manqué les cours et enfreint la discipline de l'école. Il semble, selon ses camarades de classe, que ce soit un impulsif car "ses réactions ont toujours été inattendues".


Après avoir quitté l'université Aryamehr, Ali Mollazadeh retourne à Rézaïeh où il convainc son jeune frère de 12 ans Hassan Mollazadeh à le suivre à Téhéran où il s'est engagé à le placer dans un lycée de la capitale.

Le troisième personnage dans ce déroutement est Massoud Hadj Hamidi, également originaire de Rézaïeh, âgé de 21 ans. Il avait suivi les cours de la deuxième année de la faculté technique de l'université de Téhéran et il s'était lié d'amitié avec Ali Mollazadeh au moment où ces deux jeunes gens fréquentaient le lycée de Rézaïeh.

C'est fut Ali Mollazadeh qui acheta les trois billets d'avion pour Abadan en donnant des fausses identités au bureau de vente d'Iranair.

Le plan conçu par Ali Mollazadeh exigeait trois personnes et il semble qu'il ait cherché un troisième acteur, mais que devant l'inefficacité de ses efforts, il songea à faire intervenir son jeune frère Hassan.

On ignore encore la décision définitive que les autorités irakiennes adopteront à l'égard de ces trois jeunes gens dont l'interrogatoire se poursuit à Bagdad.



150/180/4

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Political Department,
Baghdad, 22 June, 1970.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to enclose herein the text of a Note of protest No. 150/180/4/34610 of 22 June, 1970, addressed by this Ministry to the Imperial Iranian Embassy at Baghdad, about the failure by the Iranian responsible official at Khorramshahr Port to give correct and accurate information relating to the movement of ships at Khorramshahr Port. It requests the responsible officials at Iraqi Ports Administration in order that these ships may be provided with Iraqi pilots to guide these ships from Khorramshahr Port to the ports of their destination or help them go to the sea. This irregular behaviour on the part of the Iranian authorities results in delaying ships at Khorramshahr Port and prevents their departure at the fixed time. The Iranian authorities alone are responsible for this conduct.

In communicating the foregoing to the esteemed Diplomatic Corps, the Ministry request that the contents of this note may be forwarded to their governments.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Imperial Iranian Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

100/100/1/24610

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Political Department,
Baghdad, 22 June, 1970.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Imperial Iranian Embassy, Baghdad, and has the honour to inform them that it has lately been noticed that the Iranian official at Khorramshahr Port, when contacting the Assist. Chief Marine Officer of the Iraqi Ports Administration at al Wasiliyah, by telephone, gives him wrong information about the movement of ships at Khorramshahr Port. He has also got into a habit of not informing the Iraqi Officer of the time of departure of certain ships from that Port, a matter which has obliged the masters of those ships to contact the Iraqi Ports Administration from their ships either by telegram or by wireless telephone, and ask to be furnished with Iraqi pilots to guide their ships from Khorramshahr Port to the ports of their destination or to help them go to the sea. Some of these ships are the following:

1. The Japanese Vessel "Manila Maru"
2. The Kuwaiti Vessel "Alahmadiyah"
3. The Yugoslavian Vessel "Serbija"

As a result of these requests, the Iraqi Ports Administration took immediate steps to provide them with the necessary pilots.

In protesting strongly against this irregular behaviour of the Iranian authorities, the Ministry points out that the Iranian authorities alone will be held responsible for the delay of ships at Khorramshahr and their non-departure at the fixed time. The Ministry demands that the officer responsible for the movement of ships at Khorramshahr Port be obliged to furnish correct and accurate information to the responsible officials at the Iraqi Ports Administration, in order to avoid delaying ships and to regulate their movements according to the accepted Laws and Regulations relating to navigation in Shatt-al-Arab which are binding on the two countries.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

For The Imperial Iranian Embassy,
Baghdad.

D. J. Makinson, Esq.



With the compliments of

(Mr. C.D.S. Drace-Francis)

with reference to my letters
(1/14) of 23 June.

Mr Makinson
3/7

BRITISH EMBASSY
TEHRAN


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29 June, 1970

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to Mr Makinson

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E. KUWAITI-IRANIAN RELATIONS

Iraqi Comment on Zahedi's Visit to Kuwait

Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 10.7.70

Text of item:

A Foreign Ministry source has commented on the Kuwaiti-Iranian statement of 8th July issued after the Iranian Foreign Minister's visit to Kuwait and his discussions with Kuwaiti officials on the Iranian and Kuwaiti continental shelves with a view to concluding a final agreement on the matter.

The source said: The Iraqi Government, in a statement by a Foreign Ministry source on 24th February, made its views known on the Iranian-Kuwaiti statement of 13th January 1968 announcing final agreement between the two countries regarding their continental shelves.

The source added: In view of Iraq's rights in the area and because Iraq's territorial waters and its continental shelf are intermingled with those of the neighbouring countries, the Iraqi Government again asserts its adherence to its full sovereignty which extends to Iraqi territorial waters and the continental shelf, as well as to the sea bed of these territorial waters, what is beneath it, and the air space above these waters. Works and installations already erected or soon to be erected in the area are subject to the sovereignty of the Iraqi Republic.

The source asserted that the Iraqi Government, while announcing this to confirm its rights, stressed its adherence to international usage in this respect. Meanwhile the Government does not recognise any statement, proclamation, legislation, planning or agreement pertaining to Iraqi waters or to the continental shelf by any neighbouring country contrary to Iraq's rights and sovereignty in the areas in question.

[Note: The last Appendix E on Kuwaiti-Iranian relations was published in ME / 3426.]

Bo Mmm

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- 9 JUL 1970



NEQ 3/324/

With the compliments of

M. K. Jenner

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BAGHDAD

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 16

10 July 1970

17 JUL 1970

NEQ 3/324/1

John Makinson,

Iranair Hijacking

*John 16/7
Reg*

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Please refer to Drace-Francis' letters 1/14 of 23 June. The reports published here of the hijacking of the Iranair Boeing agree broadly with the Tehran version. The hijackers are named as Masoud Humaidi and Ali Mulla Zada both twenty-year old students at the College of Engineering in Tehran, and Hassan Mulla Zada the twelve-year old brother of Ali. Pictures published here show all three to be neat, clean and well dressed, and I would describe their hair as standard European length. The Iranian Embassy here and the Iranair Manager confirm that the passengers and crew of the aircraft were well treated by the Iraqis.

2. In an interview broadcast on Baghdad television on 28 June the hijackers described their act as a protest against the miserable social conditions in Iran, the policies of the Shah and his cooperation with world Zionism. They said that the conditions in which the Iranian people lived were fast deteriorating and mounting tensions would reach explosion point at any moment; revolution was knocking at Iran's door despite the repressive measures taken by the Shah who had planted 10,000 American military advisers in the army and had been conspiring with other countries to corrupt Iranian youth and destroy all patriotic sentiments among them. The struggle of the Iranian people, they said, took the form of action by many organisations with the common objectives of rooting out the corruption and expelling the imperialists. They expressed their support for the Arab struggle in Palestine and claimed that the Shah was placing Iran's territory and her oil at the disposal of Israel. They thanked the Iraqi Government for its hospitality and for the grant of political asylum. The incident now seems to be closed as far as the Iraqis are concerned.

3. I understand that Iranair flights to Baghdad have been reduced to one a week because Iraqi Airways, who are in a pool with Iranair, have reduced their weekly flights to one.

(M. K. Jenner)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

copied to C.D.S. Drace-Francis, Tehran.

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RECEIVED IN. REGISTRY No. 10 20 JUL 1970
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'Keyhan' on Iraq's Revolution Anniversary

Tehran home service in Persian 16.30 GMT 15.7.70

Excerpts from press review quotation of editorial:

'Keyhan's' editorial says in part: The 17th July is the second anniversary of the rule of the Tikriti family in Iraq. This anniversary will be forcibly celebrated in Baghdad and other countries of Mesopotamia. In the pretentious celebrations in Iraq the meaningless drums will beat and the black progress report of the Ba'th Party will be read to the Iraqi nation with honour and glory...

What can they present to the Iraqi nation apart from general poverty, mass misery, fear, make-believe courts, secret pitiless massacres, gallows and shootings, prisons full of innocent people, plunder of the government treasury and of the Iraqi nation by the Ba'th agents, disorder, theft and implementation of programmes devised by sick minds?...

The 17th July is the second anniversary of the Iraqi Ba'th Government. This is the same day that the Tikriti family - the leaders of the Ba'th Party of Iraq - overthrew the Abd ar-Rahman Arif rule and the Yahya Government in another coup and that the Iraqi Ba'thists - after that shameful 10-month suicide - again took the rule into their own hands. This time, with past experience and to maintain their rule, they announced at the beginning that they wanted to rule Iraq with a Parliamentary regime...


What services do the Ba'thists present to the Iraqi people? Their butcheries? ... What does the Ba'thist Government want to say about its foreign policy on its anniversary? Does it want to say that we are the enemies? ... What do they have to say on their internal policy and rural development? Can they say that we built at least one dam on an Iraqi river and irrigated the fertile land of Mesopotamia?...

No. They just want to govern a few more days in Baghdad with the same shouting and tumults, horns and trumpets and with the same repetitious words, while putting more money in European banks for the day of their escape.

But the Iraqi nation is awake and understands everything. Today we express our condolences to the Iraqi nation on the anniversary of the Iraqi Ba'th Party and we pray to God for the Iraqi martyrs and for the final victory of the Iraqi nation, and we will always help them and be their partner in their fight against the usurpers of their role.

W. F.

Cutting dated 18 JUL 1973



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Iraq / Iran

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Iraq urges Arab defence alliance in Persian Gulf

From DAVID HIRST: Beirut, July 17

Iraq has proposed the establishment of an Arab defence alliance to police the Persian Gulf after the planned departure of the British. Speaking in Bagdad last night President Bakr said the alliance should be composed of "independent Gulf emirates" and the "Arab Gulf States."

The proposal is a slap in the face for Iran, by far the strongest Gulf Power, which insists on playing a leading rôle in shaping the uncertain future of the area. Iraq knows as well as anybody that Iran would not stand for the establishment of a Gulf alliance to which it is not a party. She also knows that Saudi Arabia, for that reason, would not join any such alliance.

What Iraq apparently wants to do is to prevent Saudi Arabia from shepherding Kuwait and a string of lesser Arab sheikhdoms into an unofficial conservatives' alliance with Iran at the expense of the Ba'athists and anybody else, such as the South Yemenis and guerrilla movements in Muscat and Oman, with "subversive" ambitions for these oil-rich shores.

Fears

Iraq has been accusing Saudi Arabia of joining Britain, the US, and Iran in efforts to preserve the Gulf status quo under a new guise. Iraq's fears are not without foundation. After a visit to Tehran by a Saudi Minister, one Persian newspaper reported that an alliance between the two countries was being planned.

Kuwait recently incurred Iraq's displeasure when she reached agreement in principle with Iran on the demarcation of their territorial waters,

where Iraq has claims of her own.

Kuwait is the natural mediator of Gulf politics, and is busy trying to effect a reconciliation between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, but in the final analysis, recalling the late General Kassem's annexation attempt, her sympathies must lie with the conservative camp.

The proposed defence alliance is the latest sign that Iraq will from now on be taking a more active interest in the highly complex Gulf diplomacy. She has recently been inviting Gulf rulers to visit Bagdad and some observers believe that, at the same time, she hopes to take advantage of a possible reversal by Britain's new Conservative Government of Labour's decision to withdraw from the Gulf by 1974.



(70)

The Imperial Iranian Embassy,

Baghdad, 15 July, 1970.

No. 1769.

NEQ 3/324/1

Note.

The Imperial Iranian Embassy at Baghdad present their compliments to Their Excellencies the Heads of Diplomatic Missions accredited to Iraq, and, with reference to (H) Note No. 180/180/4 of 22 June, 1970, from the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Iraq about retarding the movement of ships in the Port of Khorramshahr, have the honour to state:

(H) Since the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Iraq circulated their note of protest No. 180/180/4/24610 of 22 June, 1970, to all foreign diplomatic missions accredited to Baghdad, the Imperial Iranian Embassy, on instructions received from their Government, enclose herein their Note in reply No. 1702 of 12 July, 1970, addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, for favour of perusal.

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

Their Excellencies

the Heads of Diplomatic Missions,
Baghdad.

14/7/70
Copy to
J. J. J.



*With the compliments of
The Imperial Iranian Embassy
Baghdad*

Translation.

No. 1702.

The Imperial Iranian Embassy,
Baghdad, 12 July, 1970.

Note.

The Imperial Iranian Embassy at Baghdad present their compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Ministry's Note No. 180/180/4/24640 of 22 June, 1970, about retarding ships at the Port of Khorramshahr and the non-departure of these ships at the time fixed for them, have the honour to inform them.

In view of the enquiries made by the competent Iranian quarters, there is no truth in the ~~claim~~ allegation made in the above Note, because the officials of the Iraqi Ports are originally responsible for delaying the movement of ships. These investigations also revealed that since the beginning of the Shatt-el-Arab crises, the Iraqi Ports authorities ~~have~~ at Basra have not been complying with the system and arrangement of the movement of ships ~~from~~ which are guided by Iraqi pilots, in spite of the fact that the acceptance of ships and the preparation of the Port of Khorramshahr to receive them is communicated to the Iraqi Guidance Station at Al Wasiliyah according to a proper programme, compliance being given completely to the arrangement of ships for their direction, a matter which leads to delaying the arrival of ships to the Port of Khorramshahr from their scheduled time, or vice versa, the same delay takes place when the ships leave the Port.

The delay due to flow and ebb may be accepted. However, the delay to guide ships may take as long as a period exceeding 30 hours. The Embassy gives several examples of this.

1. The Japanese ship Manila Maru belonging to the Gulf Agency, the time of arrival of which was reported to the Pilots Station at ~~DEOPHAK~~ Al Wasiliyah, waited for the Iraqi pilot at Bazu wharf in the anchorage from 1400 Hours on 21 April, 1970. At last, the Iraqi pilot arrived at 1200 Hours on 22 April, 1970, i.e. a delay of 22 hours.

2. The Yugoslavian ship SERIJA belonging to Baru Navigation Company remained at Bazu wharf waiting for an Iraqi pilot from 8 a.m. on 5 May, 1970, to 1255 Hours on 6 May, 1970, when the Iraqi pilot arrived on board the ship after 28.55 hours of delay, in spite of the fact that the Pilots Station at Al Wasiliyah was informed in advance of the schedule of the ship in question.

3. It was recently observed that the Iraqi authorities are paying no attention to the regulations in another form also.

The arrival of the ship Slowness, the schedule of which had been communicated to the Guidance Station at Al Wasiliyah, which was scheduled to be guided to the Port of Khorramshahr on 29 June, 1970, was delayed as a result of the neglect shown by the Iraqi authorities to this matter. On enquiring about the reason of the delay, these authorities replied that the delay resulted from not giving a complete list of the names of individuals for the purpose of quarantine. Afterwards, the ship arrived at the Port of Khorramshahr at 1430 Hours on 1 July, 1970, i.e. 48 hours after its scheduled time of arrival.

4. Similarly, the ship Master George, which flew the flag of Greece on its mast and belonged to Baru Navigation Company, was scheduled to be guided to the Port of Khorramshahr on 1 July, 1970. However, that was delayed for 24 hours and the ship arrived at the Port of Khorramshahr on 2 July, 1970.

5. On the other hand, the Iraqi authorities guided the ship STAPLITRE belonging to the American-Oriental Navigation Company to the Port of Khorramshahr without previous notice and not in its rotation. This action caused a confusion in the system and the turn of ships, and may lead to a protest by navigation companies.

Such being the case, it is the Basra Ports authorities who are neglecting the implementation of the instructions laid down for the control of the movement of ships and their guidance, thereby causing a delay in their movement.

The Imperial Iranian Embassy have been instructed by their Government to reject the allegation in question and to protest against this situation and to request the esteemed ~~EMBASSY~~ Ministry to be so good as to issue instructions to the competent Iraqi quarters for taking such steps as may be necessary to facilitate the movement of ships and not to delay them as soon as they receive the required information from the Iranian Ports authorities and to cooperate with the authorities of the Port of Khorramshahr.

The Embassy avail themselves of this opportunity to express their highest consideration and esteem.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq,
Baghdad.

Copy to :-

Their Excellencies the Heads of Diplomatic Missions
Accredited to Iraq, for information.

711
NEQ 3/324/1

Arab Radio Comment 27.7.70IRAQ 19.00 GMT: The Rogers peace plan (see above).LEBANON 18.00 GMT: Public interest in the presidential elections.LIBYA 13.00 GMT: The achievements of the revolution.SYRIA 11.15 GMT (repeated 18.15 GMT): US "two-faced policy" in the Middle East.UAR (11.30 GMT Commentary superseded by recording of Nasir's closing speech to the ASU congress: ME/3441/A/19.) 17.30 GMT ("We and the World"): (i) The UAR acceptance of the Rogers peace plan; (ii) the political situation in Italy."Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 10.30 GMT: Abd al-Fattah al-Adawi on Nasir's ASU speeches. 13.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Samir Abd al-Tawwab on Nasir's ASU closing speech. 14.15 GMT ("People in Sinai"): Nasir's ASU speeches. 15.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): The need to get rid of Zionist colonialism. 17.00 GMT commentary superseded by recording of Nasir's closing speech to the ASU congress.)Reports in Brief

*Es
Rmn
5/8*

Iraqi Note on Gulf and Shatt al-Arab (Text) The Arab information permanent committee met in Cairo today [27.7.70] to discuss the Iraqi delegation's Note on the Arabian Gulf and the Shatt al-Arab crisis. It repeated its former recommendations on the Arabian Gulf issue and the need to emphasise its character and to work on the implementation of the Arabian Gulf Emirates federation plan. The committee also recommended that the Shatt al-Arab crisis should be referred to the Arab League political committee. The committee then began studying the possibilities of co-ordinating Arab information resources in the light of a report by a number of Arab experts. (Beirut in Arabic 18.00 GMT 27.7.70)

Hasan Sabri al-Khuli's Damascus visit Dr. Hasan Sabri al-Khuli has said that his visit to Jordan was very successful. Before leaving Cairo for Damascus tonight, Khuli said: What happens in the next few days will show that the recent UAR step is significant for the present situation and the cause for which we are all working. Khuli has arrived in Damascus and will deliver a letter from President Nasir to the Syrian Chief of State, Nur ad-Din al-Atasi. He said the nature of relations and the present stage required continued consultation and an exchange of points of view between the UAR and Syria (Amman in Arabic 19.00 GMT 27.7.70). Dr. Hasan Sabri al-Khuli conferred with the Syrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Mustafa as-Sayyid, soon after his arrival in Damascus (Cairo in Arabic 23.15 GMT 27.7.70).

Libyan order on expropriated property The Housing and Utilities Minister, Muhammad al-Muqaryif, issued an order on 27th July forming a five-man committee to take over the buildings and land returning to the State in accordance with the law issued on 21st July, to list these properties, prepare ledgers showing their situation, land registration number and other documents and to advise on the best methods of exploiting these properties in the public interest. (Libyan Radio in Arabic 13.00 GMT 27.7.70)

Algerian-N Korean friendship society On the occasion of the week of solidarity with the people of the Korean Democratic Republic, an Algerian-Korean friendship and solidarity society has been formed. (Algiers in Arabic 13.00 GMT 25.7.70)

New Israeli Ministers The Knesset on 27th July approved the Government decision to appoint Natan Peled Immigrant Absorption Minister and Victor Shemtov Health Minister. (Israel in Hebrew 18.00 GMT 27.7.70)

P.R.M. Hincheliff, Esq.
N.E.D.
F.C.O.



With the compliments of

CHANCERY

Reference M.F.A. note
180/180/4 of 22 June.

f(65).

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

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Mr. [unclear] 30/7

with reference

Mr. Ames (MET Det) (IRAW/11 Nov 1951)

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24/7
24-7-70.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

Reg. N.E.B.
Copy for N.E.D.
PRM 11/18
In Egerston

2/5 RECEIVED IN
REGISTER No. 9
31 JUL 1970
ACTION ON NB3/359/1

14/20-17
NEQ 3/324/17 July, 1970
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

See Index,

Iran Rejects Iraqi Gulf Proposals

I enclose a copy of the best account which we have been able to obtain of a broadcast put out by Radio Iran on Friday, 24 July, in which an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman firmly rejected the proposals made by President Al-Bakr of Iraq in his radio speech on the eve of the anniversary of the Ba'athist coup in Baghdad on 17 July.

2. As might have been expected, Al-Bakr's suggestion of an all Arab defence pact for the Persian Gulf went down like a lead balloon on this side of the Shatt, when the news of Al-Bakr's speech came through last week. Although, to begin with, no official comment was made, the Iranian press jumped the gun with strong editorials on Saturday, 18 July, denouncing Al-Bakr's proposals as utterly illogical in view of Iran's long Persian Gulf coastline and rejecting his request that Iran recognise the 1937 Shatt Treaty as an attempt to return to colonialism. Al-Bakr's statement that if Iran reinstated this Treaty, Iraq would be willing to take the dispute to arbitration at the International Court of Justice and to negotiate a new formula for navigation in the estuary, was causing the Iranian authorities some embarrassment according to one journalist I talked to, but the press had no difficulty in proving the futility of this "colonialist suggestion". Kuwait's rejection of the idea of an Arab defence alliance in the Persian Gulf, which was reported in the Tehran press on Tuesday, 21 July, received very favourable comment and the Iranians were undoubtedly pleased that the Kuwaitis should have stood up so firmly to Al-Bakr.

3. On Wednesday, 22 July there was a rumour that the Iranian Government would also announce its official opposition to Al-Bakr's proposals at a press conference in the Foreign Ministry. A number of journalists went along to the Ministry at 11 O'clock, but nothing happened and with a remarkable show of independence, the local correspondents walked out of the Ministry in disgust at 1 O'clock, after it was clear that the major statement which was expected was not yet ready. According to one correspondent, the Foreign Ministry had forgotten that the Shah was at the Caspian and his approval would take longer to obtain than usual. Although there were

/further

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

RESTRICTED

11/18



further rumours on Thursday, 23 July that the press conference would finally come off that morning, the statement in the end was made in the form of a broadcast following the 2 O'clock news on Friday, 24 July. Since this is not a peak listening hour (most Iranians being either out or asleep on Friday afternoons), the broadcast did not have much impact and was even relegated to page 2 in some of the Saturday papers. I listened to the broadcast myself and got the impression that the Government was mainly concerned to justify their not accepting the suggestion that the Shatt dispute should be taken to arbitration at the International Court of Justice. As you will see for yourself, this justification included nothing new and it is therefore unlikely that Al-Bakr's proposals for a settlement of the dispute will get any further.

Yours ever,
C.D.S.

(C. D. S. Drace-Francis)

C.C.

Chanceries,
BAGHDAD,
KUWAIT,
JEDDA.

H.M. Political Residency,
BAHRAIN.

RESTRICTED

Iran-Iraq differences

IRAN REJECTS BAKR'S 'BASELESS STATEMENTS'

In an interview with the Pars News Agency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said yesterday that Iraqi President Hassan al-Bakr's plan put forward at the anniversary of the Ba'thist coup in Baghdad last week did not in fact need any answer since his statements were empty and baseless.

However, the spokesman said that "since the Pars News Agency put the question, I would like to say that it is a matter of regret that Iraq with only 40 kilometres of coastline in the Persian Gulf, should be talking of the Persian Gulf's Arabism and under this absurd pretext invite Arab littoral countries and emirates to a defence pact for preservation of the Arabism of the Gulf."

The Foreign Ministry official said that the Iraqi President had in fact ignored Iran's 850 kilometres of coastline in the Persian Gulf which stretches from Fao to the Straights of Hormos.

"You will readily agree that when the basis of argument and logic applied by the Iraqi regime's leader is so weak, any more comment on our part would be redundant and unnecessary," he said.

Referring to Bakr's statement that Iran should honour the defunct 1937 Shatt-el-Arab treaty, the spokesman said, "we should ask why Iraq itself never committed itself to observing Articles 4 and 5 of the treaty, as well as Article 2 of the supplementary protocol during the treaty's 33-year duration. Is this not a one-sided abrogation of the 1937 treaty by Iraq?" he asked.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman added that even if Iraq had not unilaterally ignored the articles in the treaty which governed its duties, the treaty should have been annulled since it was a vestige of imperialism.

"In fact it was Iraq which rendered the treaty null and void reducing it to a worthless scrap of paper, and it was Iraq which disrupted the passage of Iranian ships in the water channel, sending troops to our frontiers and creating a crisis in the relations between the two countries," he said.

He said the Iraqi president's suggestion that the Shatt-el-Arab issue be referred to the International Court of Justice was yet another futile attempt by the Iraqi regime to revive a discredited and dead letter. This is like taking a dead person to court, he said. "Iran has already communicated its views on the subject to the United Nations Security Council." Iran had stated on the strength of recognized international rules and practices that Iraq could not have absolute sovereignty over the shipping rights in a navigable frontier river. The case was similar to the Rhine and the Danube. "Iran has shown its goodwill by its readiness to sign a new treaty on navigation rights in the river on the basis of the Talweg principle," he said. "What is important is that the 1937 treaty was imposed on Iran under conditions which no longer exist; as the Shah has said recently. The era of colonialism is over and with the end of colonialism all its vestiges should also be ended. He said that Iran was prepared to settle its differences on the Shatt question with Iraq according to international principles and to sign a new treaty on the Talweg principle. (Echo)

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

BAGHDAD.

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

21 AUG 1958

NEQ/324/1

15 August

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RES. PER. (M.C. SECTION)
✓ MOD. (01.4)

General Bakhtiar

The relative calm (on the internal scene) of the summer months was disturbed on the weekend of 7-9 August when the news spread through Baghdad that General Taimur Bakhtiar the ex-head of the Iranian Security Services and the bitter opponent of the Shah, had been seriously wounded in an assassination attempt.

2. As is normal in Baghdad versions of the attempt were many and various. It is not entirely clear where the incident took place, some maintaining that it was in his house and others that it occurred while he was on a hunting trip in the region of Salman Pak. Again the versions vary as to those who committed the deed. The most popular is that it was one of his own personal aides/servants. His chauffeur has been mentioned as a possibility. Another has it that two of the three young Iranians who hi-jacked the Iranian aeroplane from Tehran to Baghdad recently were involved.

3. Whatever the truth of these various stories it is certain that he was seriously wounded and is being cared for by the Army Medical Authorities.

4. The reasons for the attempt are again fairly transparent. The Iranians would dearly love to see him out of the way and as long as he remains here in Baghdad he must be a constant thorn in the side of the Iranian Security Services. The initial story of his near death carried the dramatic addendum that it was in retaliation for the "assassination" of Abdul Ghani al Rawi in Tehran earlier this year. Whatever the truth of the events in Tehran it is widely believed here that Abdul Ghani was assassinated and it would I suppose be natural for the local people to assume that it was in retaliation. The story however loses its authenticity if one examines how this claim was supposed to have been made by the would-be assassins. A note was supposed to have been pinned to Bakhtiar's body saying that it was in retaliation. In that we know that he did not die in the attempt the story loses all possible foundation.

5. The Iranian Chargé d'Affaires when taxed with the "success" of his government's efforts to remove this liability vehemently /maintained

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

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maintained that Bakhtiar was very unpopular in Iran for his misdeeds in his days as the Head of the Security Services and that he was of no importance to his government and not considered in any way a danger. Put against the Iranian Embassy's violent reactions against Bakhtiar at the time of Bushehrazade's interrogation in January some inconsistency appears.

6. We do not know how Bakhtiar is getting on but stringent security precautions have been implemented around his house.

Yours,
JH
(J.H. Symons)

Copied to Chancery, Tehran.

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


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BRITISH EMBASSY,

TEHRAN.

25 August, 1970



Reg 2 p.m.

18/20 7/9

Dear Sir

The news of Bakhtiar's alleged death has now appeared publicly in the Tehran press. Reports based on cables from Beirut and Arab Radio programmes were printed in various papers on Sunday and Monday, 23 and 24 August, accompanied by jubilant poems and editorials acclaiming "The End of a Traitor".

2. Rumours about Bakhtiar's assassination have been very strong in Tehran circles over the past two weeks. Of the various versions which we heard, the most circumstantial was that Bakhtiar had been shot and wounded by one of his Iranian bodyguards on a hunting trip outside Baghdad and two days later had died in a Baghdad hospital. But since the Iranian authorities were not prepared to confirm or deny the story, nothing was previously made public. Even now, despite the press reports, there has been no official pronouncement, although the Reuters correspondent told us that the Iranian Military Prosecutor, when asked about the rumours a week ago, was said to have commented off the record: "the file is closed". We will let you know further if the authorities make any official statement.

3. We now understand that Bakhtiar died on 16 August.

Yours ever

Jim Chancie

(C. D. S. Drace-Francis)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
N.E.D., F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT.
H.M. Political Residency, BAHRAIN.

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Letter to PUSD Sent
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(H.E.) R.C. DEPT

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76

Mr. Mahomed 2/8
Mr. Tush 5/28/8
Mr. Ezzat




BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

(3/2) J enter c.c. RMM 28/8

22 August 1970

Dear Sir,

General Bakhtiar 74



Please refer to my letter of 15 August.

2. We now understand that Bakhtiar finally died from his wounds. The Iraqi authorities were apparently taken by surprise by this development as it had been assumed that the bullets having missed his spine he was likely to survive.
3. The original shooting incident seems to have taken place on 6 August in the Diyala river area where Bakhtiar was out hunting. His chauffeur apparently emptied his automatic weapon into Bakhtiar and the A.D.C. accompanying him, who died, and then made off. Bakhtiar first of all was taken to a civilian hospital and later transferred to the Military Hospital here in Baghdad.
4. This seems to have been an isolated incident not connected with any other recent development here.

Yours,
JH
(J. H. SYMONS)

copied to: Chancery, Tehran

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Dept.,
F.C.O.

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Baghdad 'Ath-Thawrah' Condemnation of UAR Policy

Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 6.9.70

Excerpts from press review quotation of 'Ath-Thawrah' article: entitled 'Where is Cairo heading after accepting the Rogers plan and shaking hands with the Shah?':

The Arab revolution has observed the US role in events in the Arab world ever since the Americans put forward their dubious plan and since the glorification of this plan by the capitulationist regime... This US role has a dangerous disguise and suspect information media paved the way for it. This new role aims at obscuring the goals of the Arab struggle and obliterating the boundaries between friends and enemies, between true defenders of peace and enemies of peace.

Since the acceptance of the US plan, the capitulationist regime's information machine has concentrated on the positive aspects of US policy, lacking the courage to expose the aims of the hostile US policy in the Arab world. This must inevitably lead these regimes to withdraw their criticism of US policy in other parts of the world. Those who fail to stand up to US policy in the Arab world or, even worse, those who justify this policy, are in no position to condemn US policy in Vietnam, for instance.

Any dialogue they enter on the basis of mutual confidence must inevitably lead to another dialogue, also on the basis of mutual confidence, with the United States' friends in the area of the Arab world. This is another dangerous aspect of the new US role...

Only a week after Cairo's acceptance of the US plan, Egyptian-Iranian relations began to thaw. This matches, or even surpasses, Egypt's defeatism in the UN lobbies. The Cairo rulers and President Abd an-Nasir have forgotten all the speeches they made and the attitudes they adopted in the past. The two sides expressed regret at the past misunderstanding... Some days ago Ahwaz radio carried a statement by Dr. Abd as-Salem Fahmi, Second Secretary of the UAR Embassy in Tehran, praising Iran and the Shah in particular. The UAR diplomat was commenting on the Egyptian-Iranian statement last month on the resumption of relations between the two countries...

When Abd an-Nasir announced the break in relations with the Iranian regime in the early 60s he said: We cannot send a representative to the Shah, the agent of Zionism and imperialism, now that he has recognised Israel.

We do not know if the Shah has become a patriot in the eyes of the Cairo rulers, but an answer to this can be found if one studies the course of Egyptian policy in the past 18 years, a two-faced policy known for its opportunism. The Egyptian-Iranian rapprochement is influenced by the following factors:


(1) Egyptian policy, now that it has abandoned verbal support of the major Arab issues, and in particular the Palestine issue, cannot continue its lukewarm relations with the Shah's regime...

(2) The current indirect dialogue between Cairo and Tel Aviv via Jarring must find another course. The Iranian rulers are known for their close friendship with Israel and are therefore the best means. It is natural that Egyptian-Iranian relations should be restored to normal.

(3) Egypt and Iran are united by their hatred for the Iraqi revolution and the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party. They must co-ordinate their efforts and their conspiratorial activities against our valiant revolution. Our country has foiled several subversive Iranian acts. Now it is not unlikely that Egyptian Intelligence will join the Iranian reactionaries in conspiring against our revolution. This is revealed in the UAR diplomats' statement when he said: 'Iran and Egypt are two major political forces. The area's destiny depends on these two forces.'

(4) Talk about the two major forces in the Middle East explains the new role Cairo and Tehran will be playing in suppressing the revolutionary movement in the Arab world.

The resumption of Egyptian-Iranian relations at this stage can only be another link in the larger imperialist plan which goes beyond the Palestine question to the extent of killing the revolutionary spirit and strengthening the reactionary regimes by creating ties between these regimes and regimes which recently formed part of the patriotic community. Egyptian policy has taken a dangerous course. It has taken upon itself the unholy task of blunting the popular wrath against the Shah's policy...



SAVING TELEGRAM

78
NEO. 3/324/1

PRIORITY FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(United Kingdom Mission to the United Nations)

By Bag

Sir Colin Crowe

No. 96 Saving

COPY ONLY

ps. on Shatt el Arab file

M & T.D. 22 September, 1970.

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DEC 3/324/1

24/9

U.N. General Assembly: Sixth Committee

The Sixth Committee met on 21 September and elected Houben (Netherlands) as Vice-Chairman and Owada (Japan) as Rapporteur by acclamation.

2. On the proposal of the Chairman, following consultations among delegations, the Committee adopted the order of work proposed by the Secretariat in document A/C.6/L.792, with the following two changes: the Item on the Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice is to be taken immediately after the Item on the Definition of Aggression and will be followed by the Item on International Watercourses. The Committee also accepted the Chairman's proposal to take the draft Declaration on Friendly Relations first with a view to completing discussion of this Item by the end of the current week, in order that the Declaration may be taken in Plenary in time for adoption at the 25th Anniversary Commemorative Session. The only objection to this procedure was raised by Alcivar (Ecuador) on the grounds that the Report of the Friendly Relations Special Committee had only been distributed that day and the matter was one of such importance that specific instructions from his Government would be required. The Chairman also invited the Committee to consider the possibility of proceeding at the outset to approve the draft Declaration and confining statements to explanations made after the vote.

See m.i.f.s.t.

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U.N.D.

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Action Copy on NEP 1/3.

SUMMARY OF WORKS BROADCASTS.

ME/3502/1/2.

IRAN.

EXTRACT OF SHAH'S SPEECH AT OPENING OF PARLIAMENTS & SENATE.

Tehran home service in Persian 10.30 GMT. 6.10.70.

Apart from national and historical considerations, the Persian Gulf together with free passage and shipping in it is vital to us as long as there is a drop of oil in our soil, as long as the principles of free international trade remain in force, and as long as the international principle of free shipping exists. Thus as long as the world has not achieved complete calm and secure disarmament we are compelled to strengthen Iran's armed forces on land, at sea, and in the air to whatever extent necessary to be able on our own to respond to any regional incident and to protect the country's interests. This we shall do.

P. J. M. M.

CONFIDENTIAL

British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

80

27/10

(14/6)



25 October, 1970.

29/10

Dear Peter

Iraqi Ratification of the
Hague Conventions

Reg
Research 14/11/70
I.R. 10/11/70

Copied to Legal Library
Res done 10/11/70

In my letter 14/6 of 10 October I reported Iraq's ratification of the Hague Conventions on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes of 1899 and 1907. The Government Gazette gave as one of the reasons for this ratification an Arab League Council recommendation of March 1967. It may be, of course, that the delay in implementing this recommendation was due simply to the slow working of the Iraqi administrative machine; however it is possible that the ratification at this particular time was intended to reinforce Iraq's position on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute with Iran. Since the crisis blew up in Spring of 1969 the Iraqi Government have several times publicly announced their willingness to submit the dispute to the International Court at the Hague - and this of course could have been done on a voluntary basis whether or not they had ratified the Hague conventions. However they will now certainly be in a stronger position vis-à-vis world opinion when and if the Shatt-al-Arab dispute again becomes a propaganda issue.

Po
PMM

Yam

like

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

c.c. Chancery, British Embassy Tehran (with copy of letter
14/6 of 10 October)

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

81

5/5



BRITISH EMBASSY,
TEHRAN.

30 October, 1970

Don 3/11
Reg.
Mr. Kimbly
P. M. M. 3/11

See Arnold,

There were two items in the Persian press last week about Iraq, which may be of interest:-

- (a) Farman, a raucously nationalist paper run by the Shahandens, who control Bijar in Iranian Kurdistan, published on 25 October an article claiming that the Iraqi authorities were preparing a new campaign against Iranian residents in Iraq. According to this article, the Head of the Iraqi Security Organisation suggested to the Iraqi Minister of the Interior that immediate steps should be taken to organise a mass expulsion of Iranians from Iraq. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior apparently agreed to this suggestion and any Iranian who refuses to leave Iraq by the unspecified deadline, will promptly be arrested and escorted to the frontier.
- (b) Kayhan Farsi Edition on 25 October published an article suggesting that Mullah Mustafa Barzani had rejected an invitation by President al-Bakr to go to Baghdad last week. The Kurdish leader was apparently demanding the dismissal of General Hamedî Chahab, the Iraqi Minister of Defence and Sadoun Ghiadan, the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, as being responsible for the non-execution of the Agreement of 11 March.

2. Although these articles by themselves are not perhaps very significant, we know from a journalistic source that the Iranian Government are re-considering their policy towards Iraq and no doubt one of the possibilities which must be foremost in their mind is that of re-activating the Kurdish question.

Yours ever,

Charles

(C. D. S. Drace-Francis)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

C.C.
Chancery, BAGHDAD,
KUWAIT.

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How Rose

Reg. B. Iraq/ Iran PH (82)

relation.
MM

14/12

KKUKKU

B69 TEHRAN: CAPTURED IRAQI SPY SPEAKS ON SUBVERSION

(TEHRAN RADIO) A SENIOR IRAQI INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AT A PRESS CONFERENCE IN TEHRAN TONIGHT REVEALED IMPORTANT SECRETS CONCERNING THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI BAAATHIST REGIME'S ESPIONAGE AGENCIES. CAPT. HASHIM NURI, AN OFFICER OF THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU OF THE IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL PALACE, WHO CAME SECRETLY TO IRAN ON AN ESPIONAGE MISSION SOME TIME AGO AND WAS IMMEDIATELY RECOGNISED AND ARRESTED, MADE A DETAILED STATEMENT IN TEHRAN TONIGHT AND ANSWERED MANY QUESTIONS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE ATTENDED BY IRANIAN AND FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS.

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 10
DEC 1970
NEQ 3/324/1

MF BBC MON 10/12 ZA 2319

B69 IRAQI SPY 2:

HE REVEALED IMPORTANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE IRAQI PRESIDENTIAL PALACE'S SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, THE SUBVERSIVE PLOTS OF THE BUREAU AGAINST ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES, INCLUDING IRAN, THE PRESENT SITUATION IN IRAQ AND OTHER MATTERS.

END BBC MON 10/12 ZA 2320 KY

SECRET



BRITISH EMBASSY

TEHRAN

17 December 1970

3/5

D J Makinson Esq
Near Eastern Department
FCO

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
22 DEC 1970

NEQ3/324/1

REVELATIONS OF AN IRAQI SPY

1. Enclosed is a copy of Echo's account of a press conference given here last week by an Iraqi Police Captain, who confessed that he had been engaged in espionage work in Iran on the orders of the Iraqi Government. You should note particularly the passage implying that the British are in league with the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad, on which a number of newspapers have since commented in typical anti-British fashion, boosting the myth of a Brito-Ba'athist plot against Iran.
2. We now know that Captain Nuri was in fact a double agent, who had been working for the Iranians until the latter became suspicious about the exceptionally good quality of the material he was passing on and arrested him. As regards his remarks against Britain, General Nassiri, the Head of SAVAK, told a member of this Embassy that these had not in fact been planted by the Iranians into Nuri's press conference, as we had suspected, but reflected Nuri's own genuine beliefs. At the press conference, which had been attended by all journalists, Nuri had been completely free to express whatever opinions he liked.

Yours sincerely,

CDS

C D S Drace-Francis

Copied to: Chancery
BAGHDAD

Chancery
KUWAIT

Enc

SECRET

IRAQI SPY'S PRESS CONFERENCE

Mr. Hashem Nuri, who introduced himself as a member of the Northern (Kurdish Affairs) branch of the Special Intelligence Office attached to the Iraqi Presidential Office, told a radio, television and press conference on Thursday afternoon that he had been sent to Iran to study the situation there; after an earlier mission on which two of his spies were arrested, failed to achieve its objectives of destroying vital Iranian establishments such as oil installations, bridges, etc.

Answering questions from Iranian and foreign reporters, Mr. Nuri gave details of secret Iraqi prison camps, the workings of revolutionary courts, agreement with the Kurds, and subversive activities of Teymour Bakhtiar.

Recruited

Asked how he was recruited to work for the Special Intelligence Office, Mr. Nuri said that he had graduated from a police academy and had held the rank of captain. Under the Abdul Rahman Aref Government he was sent to prison on political charges. There he met with a man called Ali Reza. Later, when Aref was deposed and they were released, Ali Reza became the head of the Special Intelligence Office of the Iraqi president Hassan al-Bakr. Ali Reza then brought Nuri into the organization, to serve in the branch that deals with the Kurdish affairs.

Subversive Activity

The beginning of his subversive activity against Iran was some seven months ago, Nuri said, when two brothers Hameh and Mosleh Jenabi, were sent to Iran to gather information and to engage in sabotage. The two brothers were related to Mohammad Rashid Jenabi, a man who had been tried and executed by a Syrian court earlier. The Iraqi intelligence office had assumed that this special relationship would help the two brothers deceive the Iranian authorities, and convince them of their story.

Their immediate mission was to ask the Government authorities in Iran for money, arms and printing equipment for use in Iraq. These were then to be used by the Baathists as evidence of Iranian subversion, and feed their propaganda machine against Iran. The plot failed when the Iranian security authorities arrested the two agents.

After the failure of this mission, Nuri was assigned to personally visit Iran and gather information, and perhaps recruit men. Although he speaks no Persian, his knowledge of Kurdish and Turkish helped him in Iran's western region, he said. He arrived in Iran at 7 p.m. on 13 August 1970, but was immediately arrested by a group of Iranian security officials. He had not had time to take any action.

(Continued on page 3)

(Iraqi - contd.)

Bakhtiar

Mr. Nuri also gave details of Bakhtiar's subversive operations in Iraq. He said that his move to Iraq was originally organized by the Special Intelligence Office, which also kept paying him, and his aides, salary and money for their operation.

He related having attended a meeting in the late Nuri Sa'idi's palace, which had been given to Bakhtiar as his residence. Attending the meeting were Bakhtiar, Reza Radmanesh (a Tudeh leader), Mostafa Babakhani (a newly recruited Iranian for espionage and subversion), Ali Reza and himself. Nuri had earlier met Babakhani at the Iranian border and had brought him to the meeting. At the meeting it was decided to send Babakhani back, with explosives and instructions to destroy Iranian oil installations, bridges, and factories. Nuri had later taken Babakhani to his own house, where he had instructed him in the use of arms and explosives.

Babakhani, too, had been arrested immediately upon his return to Iran and had not succeeded in planting even a single bomb. For his failure, Nuri had been strongly censured by Ali Reza, and Saddam Hussein Takriti, the boss of the entire Special Office.

Special Office

Nuri gave details about the structure and operation of the Special Intelligence Office. He said that it was under the overall direction of Saddam Hussein al-Takriti. It was divided into several sections, one of which dealt with Kurdish affairs, the other with Shi'as. The task of the Office was to learn of everything that went on, and thus to safeguard the regime, because the regime fears the possibility of an uprising.

The so-called special revolutionary courts maintained by the regime consist of three men who have no legal training whatsoever. Their trials consist of an hour of questioning, during which the defendant has no opportunity to present his case. The defendants are condemned to death within that time and the execution takes place within twenty-four hours.

He said when such news, and also reports of mass arrests and torture leaked to the world press, the Baathist regime tried to deceive world public opinion by establishing secret prisons. But their secret finally leaked out too, and the people of Iraq and the rest of the world learnt of the secret arrests, detentions and killings.

Britain

Commenting on foreign involvement, Nuri recalled that the Iraqi regime periodically claims to have uncovered foreign espionage networks. These have been alleged to have belonged to the United States, Israel or Iran, but never of Britain. He asked, significantly, why not even a single British spy network has been alleged.

(continued on page 4)

(Iraqi - contd.)

He added that Britain's interests in Iraq were greater than any other nations and British presence in that country had been longer.

Kurdish Agreement

Asked about the work of his own branch, Nuri referred to the agreement of last March and said that it was not worth even the ink on the paper. In the months since the agreement was signed, not even a single provision has been honoured by the Baathists. The Baathists had signed the agreement for two reasons. One was to deceive the world public into thinking that the differences with the Kurds had been settled. The second was to buy time during which the Baathists hoped to strengthen their own position. Speaking as an expert on Kurdish affairs, he opined that the agreement was nothing more than a trick to silence the Kurds.

Shatt al-Arab

Mr. Nuri was asked what the people of Iraq really thought of their Government's dispute with Iran over Shatt al-Arab. He said that the people know that Shatt al-Arab is a frontier river between two nations; and hence agree that it should be administered according to international laws concerning such rivers.

The Iraqi people abhorred, he added, the artificial crisis created by the Baathists in Iraq's relations with Iran and hoped for the normalization of these relations. He added that the Shahanshah occupied a special place in the heart of the Iraqi people.

Concern

Asked about his own family, Nuri said that he was married and had two children. He was deeply worried about what might happen to his family, and appealed to the people of Iran and the world to help ensure that the Baathists did nothing to the members of his family.

In conclusion he sent his best wishes to the people of Iran and hoped that Iranian relations would be soon normalized with Iraq.

At the beginning of the press conference, the NITV commentator who introduced the Iraqi, said that while in Iran Capt. Nuri had had an opportunity to study the situation in this country and to contrast Iranian political stability and economic development with the unrest and instability brought by the Baathists in Iraq; and had therefore personally requested a press conference to voice his views.

(Echo of Iran)

CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

2/12

18 December, 1970

Top copy
on NB 3/359/1

19

Dear Richard,

~~PM 5/324/2~~
~~NEQ 3/324/1~~

I enclose a copy of my record of two conversations I had earlier this week with Directors General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. These further indications of Iraqi preoccupation with Gulf affairs will cause no surprise. It may be worth mentioning that two days later the Baghdad Observer carried a full page article under the heading "The Arab Gulf between Imperialist Schemes and the National Liberation Struggle". It is much better written than anything the editorial staff could produce and we strongly suspect the author to have been the Director General of Political Affairs himself, who has for some years been Iraq's expert on the Gulf. The article, of which my Chancery is sending a copy to Peter Hinchcliffe, is careful not to attack the Rulers in the course of its criticisms of British policy.

3. However, the principal object of this letter is to enquire whether the two documents attributed to Julian Bullard in paragraph 4 of my minute are genuine, and correctly summarized by Jamali. Perhaps Julian, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, would let me know. Perhaps too he would confirm, in connection with Jamali's complaint in paragraph 3 of the minute, that the Ruler of Ajman did not ask for these teachers. I don't propose to go out of my way to discuss the general subject further with Jamali, but since I may well find myself obliged to do so, it would be useful to know which of his statements recorded in the enclosure, I can safely deny.

Yours ever
Glen
(H. G. Balfour Paul)

R. M. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

Copied to: G. G. Arthur, Esq., C.M.G.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
LONDON S.W.1.

Sir Denis Wright, K.C.M.G.,
H.M. Ambassador,
TEHRAN.

J. L. Bullard, Esq.,
British Political Agent,
DUBAI.

CONFIDENTIAL

CALLS ON DR. MAHMUD ALI AL DAUD AND SAYYID ABDUL HUSAIN AL JAMALI

I was summoned on 14 December by both the D.G. of Political Affairs and the D.G. of Arab Affairs in the M.F.A. It transpired that both wanted to question me on British policy in the Gulf, but that neither was aware the other was also doing so. (Another case of "the left hand not knowing what the left hand is doing".) Dr. Daud started by drawing my attention to an item in the B.B.C. Arabic Service of 7 December, in which a B.B.C. commentator, answering a Listener's Question on the Iran/Iraq dispute in the Shatt al Arab, had recited the Iranian version and ignored the Iraqi one. He asked whether the B.B.C. could not be prevailed upon to take a more impartial line. After the usual demurrers I suggested that he send me the text so that I could see what it said. I shall minute separately on this minor matter when I have seen it.

2. He then got down to what was obviously the purpose of the summons and questioned me on British policy in the Gulf, withdrawal plans, U.A.E., current Anglo/Saudi talks, etc. I was, I hope, appropriately bland and unforthcoming, and was able to point out that he had himself taken notes when I had recently gone through the subject of our Gulf policy with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. And when he suggested that we were not trying hard enough over the U.A.E., I bridled righteously and reminded him that when I had sought his Ministry's assistance immediately before the Rulers' Meeting in Abu Dhabi in October, in the shape of some favourable publicity for the Union, I had been given the brush-off.

3. My session with Jamali was of greater interest. In his case the lead-in related to the treatment given to two Iraqi teachers for whom (he said) the Ruler of Ajman had asked. Visas had not been granted until "we" had obtained substitute teachers from Kuwait. Jamali explained that he was not making an issue of his particular instance, but it appeared to reflect an attitude on our part which the Iraqis thought unfriendly. Since I could not remember the details (in point of fact I see from the files that he misrepresented the facts, see Dubai tel No. 267 of 22 October, folio 29 on 40/18) I let him proceed to generalities.

4. In the course of the ensuing conversation Jamali claimed that the Ministry had on their files:

- (a) A circular addressed by Mr. Bullard (whom he quoted by name) to the Trucial States Rulers in December 1969, telling them to accept no assistance from Iraq.
- (b) A recent report by Mr. Bullard, commissioned by the Rulers, on illegal immigration into the Trucial States, which dealt with illegal immigrants from the Yemens, Pakistan and Iraq, but made no mention of Iran.

The Ministry, he said, had considered summoning me about (a) at the time, but had decided to let it pass. But he was instructed to draw my attention to (b), in which the conspicuous omission of reference to illegal immigration from Iran naturally aroused Iraqi suspicion. He did not offer to show me either of these documents (nor can I trace any reference to them in the files); but if genuine, they point to an unwelcome leakage. His constant reference during the

/discussion

- 2 -

discussion to Ajman suggested that the Iraqis might have some special relationship with that State.

5. It seemed best to hit back. I therefore said:

- (a) Iraqi allegations, of which I had noticed one or two recently in the press, of wholesale Iranian immigration into the States were nonsense, and would certainly give offence to the governments accused of encouraging it. In point of fact I believed I was right in saying that, in the figures emerging from the 1967 Census, the percentage of people of Iranian origin was almost exactly the same as that in Lorrimer's house to house count in 1908. There was, of course, an increasing immigrant labour force from Baluchistan and elsewhere, but this was migrant and not resident.
- (b) If the Iraqis harboured suspicions against the Rulers or ourselves of wishing to keep them out, he must remember that coins had two sides. Although his Ministry repeatedly assured us that the Iraqi Revolution was not for export, it would be absurd to expect everyone else to be quite so confident of Iraqi intentions. His government openly supported what it called national liberation movements in many non-revolutionary countries. Eritrea was one that came to mind. What the Iraqis might regard as simply assisting "depressed minorities" looked to others more like interference in other peoples countries, where the mode of government did not suit Iraqi tastes. But what would the Iraqis themselves have thought if the Ethiopians or the Turks, or the British, had assisted the Kurdish minority in their country? If some of the Rulers, who did not share Iraq's ideology, were uneasy about Iraqi intentions towards them - and consequently looked twice at visa applications - he really must not be surprised. Nor must he be surprised if they chose to consult the Political Agent.

6. Mr. Jamali insisted that he was not out for a quarrel, wanted the best possible relations with Britain and the Trucial States, and declared that there were no sinister intentions behind Iraqi offers of technical assistance to those small States. The conversation then proceeded to other aspects of Gulf affairs on which I took the standard line.

7. It may be worth recording that, according to Dr. Daud, the Iraqi News Agency supply a full daily monitor/service of the B.B.C. and that the Iraqi authorities obtain their British newspapers four times a week through Tehran.

(H. G. Balfour Paul)
17 December, 1970

Mr Mackenzie
then entered
submit with
reference
PMMH/B

RESTRICTED



British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

(3/2)

21/1

21 December, 1970.

Gen Ltr,

B.B.C. Arabic Service

NEQ 3/324/1

PBM 5/324/2

As he has reported in his letter 2/12 of 18 December to Richard Evans, the Ambassador was recently called in by the D.G. of Political Affairs ostensibly to receive a mild protest about a B.B.C. Arabic Service programme of 7 December in which (so Dr. Daoud said) the Shatt-al-Arab dispute between Iran and Iraq had been described purely in terms of the Iranian version.

2. Dr. Daoud subsequently sent over the offending text of which a translation is enclosed. It does not seem to us particularly offensive; but the Iraqis have rather more right on their side than the B.B.C. commentator suggested. Dr. Daoud, incidentally, was careful to express appreciation of the neutral attitude taken by H.M.G. on the Shatt issue.

Jenner

(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

Thank you 3/2
6/19

RESTRICTED

6/19 to see. You may
wish to mention this
informally to the BBC at
a suitable opportunity.
Beckett 2/2

In a question and answer programme in the B.B.C. Arabic **Service** at 7.45 a.m. on 7 December the following answer was given to a listener's question:-

"..... In this connection, the wording used by the listener in the question when he says 'at the time at which Iran is concentrating its military forces on the Republic of Iraq' implies that Iran is thinking of taking hostile measures, whereas there is nothing to confirm this. The situation, as has been revealed in London, is that Iran has renounced the Treaty of 1937 with Iraq concerning control over the Shatt-al-Arab because, for no shortcoming on its part, i.e. on the part of Iran, it has not been completely implemented or enforced. Iran says that it is now prepared to negotiate for a new agreement, and is in the meantime exercising control over one half of the Shatt-al-Arab."

British Embassy,

BAGHDAD.



NEQ 3/324/1

28 December, 1970.

85

John Jenner

LAST PAPER

Iraqi or Iranian Agent?

--- I enclose press cuttings from
--- the Tehran newspaper Al-Kayhan on
12 December and the Baghdad Observer of
23 December about one Hashim Nuri whom
the Iranians claim to be an Iraqi spy. The
Iraqis, as you will see have replied at
length alleging that Nuri is a renegade
Police officer working for Iran. The Iraqi
reaction may be largely due to the large
audience which Ahwaz Radio and T.V. have
in Iraq.

John

M. K. Jenner

(M. K. Jenner)

Miss V. E. Beckett,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

LAST PAPER

c.c. Chancery, Tehran.

Don 31/12
Mr. McMahon
pn
15 27/12

CAPTURED IRAQI — 'I CAME TO SPY'

A self-professed Iraqi police captain said here Thursday that he had entered Iran illegally and had been arrested while trying to begin "espionage and sabotage work" on the orders of the Iraqi President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr.

Hashem Nuri, 29, said he was arrested by Iranian guards on August 17, shortly after he had arrived in Iran.

Nuri said he had been "attached to the special bureau of the Iraqi Presidential Palace" and claimed he had been behind at least two attempts at getting sabotage missions off the ground in his country.

Speaking at a news conference, Nuri also claimed he was an expert in Kurdish affairs and did not believe that the Baghdad-Barzani accord of March, 1970 would work. This, he said, was because the Iraqi Ba'athist rulers did not wish to keep their promises to the Iraqi Kurds.

He also said that he had a wife and two children he has left behind in Iraq and for whose safety he was "extremely worried."


He said that he had been ordered by a man called Alireza to send spies into Iran seven months ago. "The spies I sent to this country," he said, "were immediately arrested by Iranian security people."

He identified the two alleged spies as Mosleh and Hamzeh Jenabi and said their mission had met with total failure.

Later, he went on, he was ordered to enter Iran personally and to carry out the mission.

The Jenabis had been directed to pose as potential coup leaders in Iraq and to ask the Iranian authorities to give them arms and money.

"This was later to be used as a propaganda stunt against Iran by the Ba'athist leaders of Iraq who wished to make up a



HASHEM NURI

Iraqi

(Continued from page 1)

story saying that Iran was trying to topple the Bakr regime through its agents," he said.

"The Iranian officials, however," Nuri went on, "were aware of the real intentions of the Jenabias."

Nuri also revealed details of the "revolutionary court" that sent 44 men to their death within 24 hours last year.

He said that the "court" was headed by an army officer and had two other members who were "all ignorant of law." The two members were a college student and a secondary school teacher respectively.

Nuri described Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussain al-Takriti as "the man behind the massacres in our country" and said he had ordered his agents to murder any Ba'athists who dared oppose his rule.

Nuri went on to say that terror, assassination and torture had become "common features of life in Iraq" and that thousands of Iraqi patriots were "rotting in secret prisons."

Asked the reason for Air Marshal Hardan al-Takriti's dismissal as vice-president a few weeks ago, Nuri said, "The row was about money. Hardan had taken a large bribe from

the oil companies but had refused to share it with Bakr and his aides."

He hinted that the present Iraqi leadership was "somehow in league with British interests."

"Iraqi public opinion," Nuri said, "always wonders how it is that so-called American, Israeli and Iranian spy rings are constantly being discovered in Iraq while no British espionage organizations were exposed. This is interesting because Britain has special interests in Iraq."

Claiming that Britain had strengthened its position in Iraq, he hinted that Bakr and his colleagues were in contact with oil companies.

Asked to reveal information about the late Teymur Bakhtiar's activities in Iraq, Nuri said the cashiered Iranian general had been used "for anti-Iranian purposes by the Iraqi leadership."

Bakhtiar, who was shot dead in north Iraq last summer, had been working under the direct control of Iraqi security forces.

He related one of his "personal experiences" with Bakhtiar. An Iranian called Morteza Babakhani had arrived secretly in Iraq and was met by Nuri, who took him to Baghdad to meet Bakhtiar.

In Baghdad, Babakhani met Bakhtiar in Nuri's presence and was given 100,000 rials by the cashiered general to use for

anti-government activities in Iran. He was also given a few hand bombs and received training in their use, Nuri claimed.

Babakhani also met Saddam Hussain al-Takriti and received special orders. "But as soon as Babakhani entered Iran he was arrested by Iranian authorities," Nuri said.

Asked about Irano-Iraqi dispute over the Shatt al-Arab border waterway, Nuri said the whole dispute had been conjured up by the Iraqi rulers who are "bitterly hated by our people."

He added that the two countries should use the estuary in accordance with international law concerning border waterways.

IRANIAN AGENT EXPOS

An official spokesman has exposed Iranian agent Hashem Nouri who is being used by the Shah's regime in its campaign of propaganda and forgery against the progressive July 17 revolution.

A responsible spokesman has stated to the INA the following: "at 12 o'clock on Friday, December 11, 1970 Iran's TV and broadcasting stations transmitted the text of the press conference held as was mentioned by an Iraqi who occupies a high post and who has been told to commit espionage activities inside Iran. Iran's information media has prepared others' minds for the said conference. On Thursday, December 10, 1970, a morning newspaper has pointed out that at the conference would expose very important issues. At 8 o'clock the same evening the Iranian broadcasting station in its news bulletin said that the above-mentioned Iraqi has acquainted himself with the real conditions in Iran during the period of his press conference to make his statements. The repentant Iraqi mentioned or was ordered to say the following:

- 1— Name Hashem Nouri.
- 2— His work: Formerly a police captain and an adviser at the Presidential Palace for northern affairs at present.

3— He mentioned that he was formerly a police captain. When the Directorate-General of Police was asked, it was found that there is a dismissed police lieutenant whose name was Hashem Nouri Tozolo and it is believed that he is the person referred to. His file No. 4016 indicates the details of his services.

a) On June 27, 1962, he was appointed a police lieutenant with a salary of ID.28 at the

and in accordance with articles No. 115,273 of Baghdad Penal Code for a search of the house of Abdul Kham's Abbas and taking his unlicensed hunting gun and keeping it when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate — Order No. 16,612.

b) On June 10, 1965, he was questioned in accordance with Kaimaqamiyat Kada' Kufri's letter concerning the bribe he took from Salem Sulaiman in the form of a present — the letter of Kaimaqam of Kufri No. 671 on July 12, 1965.

i) On June 19, 1965, the Committee of Police Affairs in its Decision 192/1966 decided to postpone his promotion till the end of the charges against him and he was notified by the letter of the Directorate-General of Police No. 31,926.

j) On June 22, 1965, he was referred to a committee so as to be investigated and tried in accordance with Article No. 244 of Baghdad Penal Code for arresting Ismail Qassim without grounds, when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate Order No. 32,727.

k) On August 2, 1965, he was questioned by the senior police inspector for the second area concerning Item 4 of the letter of Kaimaqam of Kada' Kufri No. 676 dated July 12, 1965, for receiving a bribe from Hassan Alawi (ID.30).

l) On September 27, 1965, he was reprimanded for neglecting to write a report when inspecting a certain house and for not writing on the result of his investigation when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate — Order No. 51,769.

onment in accordance with Article No. 90, Paras 53 and 54 of Baghdad Penal Code.

(U) On March 16, 1967, he presented a petition requesting to be reinstated to his post but the Directorate-General of Police refused his request by the footnote dated on March 27, 1967.

(V) On May 31, 1969, the Penal Court of Kifri sentenced him to a four-month imprisonment in accordance with Article 244 of Baghdad Penal Code.

4) From what is said it becomes clear that the Iranian Intelligence Service has done wrong when it has chosen the abovenamed to play this role and it should have known its agents well before demanding of them to make exposed propaganda activities like that done by Hashem Nouri Tozolo. May be it is excused for doing so because such a work cannot be done but by that who possesses the qualities of Hashem Nouri and his background.

5) He mentioned that he had acquainted himself with the great achievements made by His Majesty the Shahenshah

for the Iranian people during his arrest and investigation.

But we really cannot understand what can a person who is accused of espionage, be acquainted with. May be the Iranian authorities treat the spies as tourists and foreign official delegations. So they acquaint them with the progress and the aspects of civilization so as to change their minds and announce repentance as Hashem Nouri Tozolo has done.

6) The legitimate rights of Iraq in Shat-al-Arab is a thing on which no two Iraqis dispute and what he mentioned of Iran's rights uncovers once again the nature of relation between the above-named and the Iranian authorities.

7) The Iranian Intelligence Service has demanded of its agent to act this role at the time when the campaign of forgery and arousing doubts is being waged by the Heykailian information media against the progressive revolution of Iraq and

if there is no joint coordination between the two campaigns, no doubt there is a mutual aim between them".

AN AGENT EXPOSED

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1— Name Hashem Nouri.

2— His work: Formerly a police captain and an adviser at the Presidential Palace for northern affairs at present.

cooperate with the Iranian government.

3— That Iran is right in its dispute with Iraq concerning Shatt-al-Arab and that there is a special respect for the Shahenshah in the hearts of the Iraqi nationalists. When the authorities concerned were asked concerning the existence of an Iraqi bearing the same name and the same post mentioned by him it had been found:

1— There is no existence for an official or an employee at the Presidential Palace by the name of Hashem Nouri.

2— There is no existence for a post of an adviser at the Presidential Palace at present or formerly.

3— He mentioned that he was formerly a police captain. When the Directorate General of Police was asked, it was found that there is a dismissed police lieutenant whose name was Hashem Nouri Tozlo and it is believed that he is the person referred to. His file No. 4015 indicates the details of his services.

a) On June 27, 1962, he was appointed a police lieutenant with a salary of ID.28 at the Directorate of Kirkuk Police in accordance with Order No. 28,252.

b) On July 27, 1962, the Directorate General of Police demanded in its confidential letter No. 4484 to be put under observation and to submit reports about him, i.e. five days after he was appointed. A thing which indicated that he had bad reputation during his stay at the Police College.

c) On October 1, 1963 he was transferred to Ramadi Police Directorate upon an order issued by the Director-General of Police during his visit to the northern area because of the numerous complaints against him from the population of the governorate — Order No. 43,864.

d) On June 28, 1964, he was transferred to Mobile Police Force with a number of lieutenants and police officers because of the complaints and the reports submitted against them in transgressing against the citizens. It was said of him that he had received bribes — Order No. 30,529.

e) On January 30, 1965, he was referred to an investigation committee to be questioned and tried in accordance with Articles 90 and 115 of Baghdad Penal Code for taking bribe from a person named Saïed Mehdi when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate — Order No. 4794.

f) On March 29, 1965, he was referred to an investigation committee to be tried in accordance with Article 90 of Baghdad Penal Code for taking bribe from Shehab Ahmed and Mohammed Khedair when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate. Then it was decided to suspend him from his post until the result of the investigation and the trial — Order No. 16,462.

g) On March 30, 1965, he was referred to a committee to be investigated and tried for the charge against him

took from Saïem Sumanan in the form of a present — the letter of Ka'maqam of Kufri No. 671 on July 12, 1965.

i) On June 19, 1965, the Committee of Police Affairs in its Decision 192/1956 decided to postpone his promotion till the end of the charges against him and he was notified by the letter of the Directorate General of Police No. 31,926.

j) On June 22, 1965, he was referred to a committee so as to be investigated and tried in accordance with Article No. 244 of Baghdad Penal Code for arresting Ismail Qassim without grounds, when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate Order No. 32,727.

k) On August 2, 1965, he was questioned by the senior police inspector for the second area concerning Item 4 of the letter of Ka'maqam of Kufa dated July 12, 1965, for receiving a bribe from Hassan Alawi (ID.30).

l) On September 27, 1965, he was reprimanded for neglecting to write a report when inspecting a certain house and for not writing on the result of his investigation when he was at Kirkuk Police Directorate — Order No. 51,769.

m) On October 6, 1965, he was questioned by the Senior Police Inspector for the Sixth Area for receiving a bribe from Jamhour Met'ib. Sentence letter 9777/C.

n) On November 4, 1965, he was reinstated to his post on condition that investigation should be continued with him concerning the remaining issues.

o) On April 4, 1966, he was suspended from his post once again because he was placed under arrest by the Commander of the field force in accordance with his authority granted by the National Security Law and until the result of the investigation. That is because of his bad behaviour — Order 17,783.

p) On July 10, 1966, he was fined a 5-day cut of his salary Order 37,338.

q) On July 11, 1966, he was rebuked — Order 37,605.

r) On September 13, 1966, he was reprimanded for his negligence — Order 50,543.

s) On November 12, 1965, because of committing dangerous acts affecting his duties and many punishments he received for his bad conduct, it was decided to dismiss him from office for a year — Order of the Ministry of Interior No. 62,516 on November 10, 1966.

t) On March 15, 1967, the Penal Court of Karatuba sentenced him to a month's imprisonment.

de.
4) From what is said it is clear that the Iranian Intelligence Service has been wrong when it has chosen the abovenamed to play this role and it should have known the agents well before demanding of them to make exposed pagandist activities like those done by Hashem Nouri Tozlo. May be it is excused for doing so because such a thing cannot be done but by one who possesses the qualities of Hashem Nouri and his background.

5) He mentioned that he had acquainted himself with the great achievements of the late Shah of Iran by His Majesty the Shah.

Iran/Iraq Relations: Capture Of Suspected Iraqi Spy; Alleged Assassination Of Ex-Head Of Iranian Security Services; Hijack Of Iranair Boeing. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 4 Feb. 1971. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1252. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475759/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=84c7fa2e&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.